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• Figure 5: Estimate of 
possible achievement 
(sq m and cost s) 
commercial and NGOs. 
• Figure 6: Estimate of 
possible achievement 
commercial, NNGOs 
and non-commercial. 
Year Organisation Cost Per Sq m 
Type 
1996 Commercial KM 3.6 or $ 1.8 
2002 Estimated as 
1999 NNGOs KM 2.81 Or$ 1.40 
2002 Estimated as 
1997 NNGOs KM 2.81 or $ 1.40 
2002 Estimated as 
1996 Grand Total 
2002 
Year Organisation Cost Per Sq m 
TyJ>e 
19% Commercial KM 3.6or $ 1.8 
2002 A \'cragc Actual 
Cost 
1999 NNGOs KM 2.81 Or$ 1.40 
2002 A ,·crage Actual 
C:osl 
1997 NGOs KM 2.81 or $ 1. 
2002 Estimated Cosl 
1999 Civil Protection KM 2.30or $1 
2002 Estimated Cost 
1999 Entit~· Arm ics KM2.10or$1 
2002 Eslimaled C:osl 
Grand Total 
similar environmem, could potentially 
have cleared 57 million more sq meters 
for rhe same amount of money, as opposed 
to the 11.4 million sq meters that was 
achieved-an increase of 45.6 million sq 
meters or 400 percent. The estimate of 
possible achievement brings together a 
combination of factors, and illustrates 
that considerably more clearance could 
have been achieved had more emphasis 
been placed on the effective usc of donations. 
It should also be emphasised that with 
properly priorirised site selection the 
possible increase could have been as high 
as 25 percent more rhan indicated. In other 
words, for a cost of KM 242 million, an 
estimated output of 116.9 million sq 
meters could have arguably been achieved. 
Summary 
The study attempted ro revi ew ev-
ery aspecr of the demining process, 
comparing organisation types and their 
individual and collective demining efforr. 
It also reviewed a number of ocher aspects 
that have an influence on effectiveness, 
such as the need for a balanced response 
to funding, the importance of timely 
donations and the selection of the most 
suitable ground conditions. In addition, 
an example of the various time, effort, 
method and costs illustrated the impor-
tance, not just of rime and site selection, 
Sq m Cleared Total Cost 
20,971,472 KM 75,497,299 
($ 37,748,650) 
2,414,930 KM 6,785,953 
($ 3,392,977) 
56,939,501 KM 160,000,000 
($ 80,000,000) 
80,325,903 KM 242,283,252 
($ l2J,J .U,626) 
Sq Ill Cleared Total Cost 
20,971,472 KM 75,497,299 
($ 37.748,650) 
2,414,930 KM 6,785,953 
($ 3,392,977) 
14,944,750 
10,224,808 KM 160,000,000 
($ 80,000.000) 
44,994,374 
93,550,334 KM 242,283,252 
($ 121.141.626) 
bur also the selection of the most effec-
tive method. In order to work effectively 
throughout the year, many decisions 
about when, where and how to work need 
to be made. Realistically, it will not 
always be possible to achieve the ideal 
effectiveness optimization. The study 
proved char at presem, many of the criti-
cal elemems for achieving effectiveness 
are not even considered. The facts are that: 
• Many donations are not mad e 
available in rime to achieve the most 
effective results. 
• Sire selection, based on the best 
conditions to achieve effective demining, 
is rarely considered. 
• Commerciai!NNGOs completed 
more sq meter!KM ($) rhan the non-
commercial with fewer personnel. 
• Commercial and NNGOs have 
completed more tasks/KM ($) than the 
non-commercial. 
• Commercial and NNGOs have 
destroyed more mines/KM ($) chan the 
non-commercial . 
• The average cost per sg meter un-
dertaken by the non-commercial groups 
is at lease five rimes higher than the 
average cost per sq meter of the com-
mercial/NNGOs groups. 
• The commerciai/NNGOs work 
more hours per day and more days per 
month than the non-commercial sector. 
• Many donors stated that they 
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are "not interested" in their donati on 
being utilised more effective ly. 
• In BiH, political, institutional and 
personal views have had a negati ve 
impact on the effective use of donations; 
political and international objectives have 
delayed the effective creation of a sus-
tainable national capaci ty. 
• Donors are supporting more 
projects that have little or no effect on 
improving productivity, cost effectiveness 
or the removal of the cause. 
• While annual output has remained 
at around 6 to 6.7 million sg meters, the 
number of tasks and mines destroyed has 
gradually dec reased since 2000; yet, 
technical survey and the increased n um-
ber of deminers since 1999 should have 
dramatically increased the sq meters 
cleared and number of tasks completed. 
The lack of a balanced, business-like 
approach that addresses safety, quality, 
productivity and effectiveness, at inter-
national, institutional and organisational 
levels, as well as at the national mi ne 
action programme level, is obvious. The 
lack of char balanced approach, coupled 
with the ineffective management of those 
responsible for implementing donations 
unnecessarily, prolongs the suffering of 
affected populations. Yet, we still obtain 
these donations "In the name of human-
icy." If we are truly humanitarian we need 
to focus more on removing the threat of 
landmines as quickly and as safely as pos-
sible so that affected countries can begin 
the long process of post-conflict recovery. • 
in order to 1 iew the full study, check out 
www. eandii. com. 
*Ail graphics courtesy of the author. 
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• 
From Kosovo to 
Afghanistan, Cluster 
Bombs Again 
Cluster bombs have created problems in several countries, as they are one 
of the many unexploded hazards often left behind after a conflict. This article 
gives an overview of the threat and shows how the organization lntersos 
has been working to help clear up the problem. 
by Fernando Termentini, 
/ntersos 
Background 
Cluster bomb units (CBUs) are 
well known from the Gulf War to post-
Dayton Bosnia, bur they were completely 
forgotten by the Ottawa Treacy, which 
didn't recognize them as APLs. In Kosovo 
and in Afghanistan, they have proven to 
be more dangerous chan APLs. 
Cluster bombs are UXO char became 
well known in Italy when some fishermen 
found them in their nets in the Adriatic 
Sea. Apart from the fishermen, whose 
security was threatened, nobody at rhar 
rime spoke out in Italy about the fi.1ture 
danger: hundreds of these UXO would 
spread in Kosovo and Serbian territory, 
killing and injuring people, mostly children. 
In fact, CBUs don't have a self-deactivating 
device that disables them if they do not 
explode, so they remain as a long-lasting 
danger for civilians, and they can explode 
with a slight touch or upon removal. 
Modern CBU models are BL-7 and 
BL-755, made in the United Scares, and 
MK-41, made in the United Kingdom. 
They are the "elder sisters" of the weapons 
used in Kuwait and of the KB-1 used by 
Serbs and Muslim Bosnian people during 
the Balkan Wars. 
CBUs differ from APLs in their 
appearance, the former being more 
colourful and intriguing, so chat they 
can trigger people's curiosity. An APL 
is basically a defensive ordnance with a 
local target, while a CBU is an offensive 
ordnance with a wide-area target. CBUs 
are real unexploded craps with much 
more explosive capaci ty than APLs, as 
an APL can kill at a range of 50 m, while 
a CBU can be fatal at a range of 150m. 
In fact, CBUs are dropped during 
air raids in dispensers with a capacity 
of more than 200 bombs each, landing 
randomly on the ground. When they 
do not explode, they hide in the grass 
or under the ground, up to 50 em deep, 
so char nobody can really cell where 
they are. In principle, APLs should be 
mapped, making their identification, 
markina and clearance easier and allowing 0 
civilians to avoid them. CBU impact 
areas, instead, are very wide targets, diffi-
cult to identicy and map before systematic 
surveys and clearance are carried out. 
They can be identified scarring from 
their drop point, if known, or by tracing 
them on the ground in a sequence. 
CBUs in Kosovo 
CBU producers claim a dud rate 
nor higher chan five percent, bur according 
to our field experience, the actual 
percentage is much more significant. 
At the end of th e war, in fact, the 
biggest and most urgent problem of 
Kosovo was that of unexploded CBUs. 
In rhe spri ng of 2000, CBUs were 
spread everywhere on the ground, 
hindering the economi c development 
and agriculwral activities after the 
winter of war. 
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• The BL-97 (top and bottom) 
In those days, we knew exactly where 
90 percent of Kosovo's mines were, 
because the Serbs handed over the maps 
of registered mined areas to the interna-
tional community. But we didn't know 
with the same accuracy where CBUs had 
been dropped. In fact, we had little news 
on Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) 
coordinates of dropping points, which 
made it virtually impossible to fix the 
accual affected areas and quantifY rhe real 
problem. 
Immediately, the international 
community launched an appeal to quickly 
1
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fund and eliminate rhe threat. The imer-
narional answer was fast and appropri-
ate, wirh a substantial economic pledge 
and the professionalism of five major in-
ternational non-governmental organiza-
tions (NGOs). These specialized in hu-
manitarian clearance in general and, more 
specifically, in the problem of CBUs. 
Among these NGOs was the Inrersos 
Mine Action Unit, a unique Italian NGO 
that, besides a humanitarian relief project, 
has conducted humanitarian mine and 
UXO clearance as well as mine risk edu-
cation projects since 1997. 
International actors spent rwo years 
clearing CBUs from Kosovo. Nowadays, 
rhe final work is carried out by the Kosovo 
Protection Civil Agency, with local ex-
perts trained at the beginning by rhe in-
ternational technical expe rts of the 
Imersos Mine Action Unit and other in-
ternational NGOs. 
CBUs in Other Countries 
The threat of CBUs in the Balkans 
is nor only a problem in Kosovo. In the 
Republic of Serbia, for example, UXO 
remain everywhere-even in public gar-
dens-as the Imersos Mine Action Unit's 
experts pointed our in June 2001 after 
an accurate assessmem of the territory ro 
define rhe magnitude of rhe problem. 
In Afghanistan, we found a dud rare 
as high as 50 percent in some case. Ir is 
to be mentioned that, prior to the Coali-
tion Forces Military Campaign, barrie 
area clearance (BAC) operations in Af-
ghanistan were mainly conducted by sur-
face clearing. The widespread use of 
CBUs during the air campaign and the 
Village Area Mined 
(in sq m) 
Karoti 363,500 
Mosazajee 248,200 
lethality of cluster submunitions have 
forced the Mine Action Centre for Af-
ghanistan (MACA) ro adopt stricter Stan-
dard Operating Procedures (SOPs) simi-
lar to the ones adopted by the UN Mine 
Acrion Centres in Kosovo and Bosnia-
Herzegovina (BiH), where the depth of 
clearance for CBUs is set at 500 mm. 
Thus, it was necessary ro train BAC teams 
on the use of the Schonsted metal detec-
tor, a new instrument specifically de-
signed for detecting ferrous materials to 
a depth of 500 mm. Intersos provided 
approximately 60 Schonsted detectors ro 
the Afghan NGO partner and trained 
three BAC teams to use them properly 
and efficiently. 
The following are two main ex-
amples of CBU data collected: 
l. Kabul Province, Karoti Village: 
363,500 sq m infested by mines (agri-
cultural and grazing ground). Dispens-
ers dropped: 4. Total cluster bombs 
dropped (BL-97): 800. Wirh 80 percent 
of rhe area cleared, we found 484 
unexploded BL-97s (60 percent of the 
rotal). 
2. Kabul Province, Mosazajee Vil-
lage: 248,000 sq m infested by mines 
(agricultural and grazing grou nd). Dis-
pensers dropped: 6. Total c l uster 
bombs dropped (BL-97) : l ,200. With 
90 percent of the area cleared, we 
found 513 unexploded BL-97s (43 
percent of rhe total). 
CBUsandthe 
International Community 
Overall, CBUs are not considered 
similar in the effects to APLs. For this 
reason, they were not restricted by the Ot-
tawa Treaty. Cluster bombs, which con-
tinue robe used, pollute the environment 
and are a serious threat for civilians. They 
represent a real limitation ro rhe eco-
nomic development of states and a seri-
ous economic burden for rhe interna-
tional community. 
In fact, a matter of primary impor-
tance is to conduct humanitarian clear-
ance of these affected rerrirories, which 
means areas need ro be 99.6 percent clear, 
as international standards dictate. This 
kind of percentage involves great costs 
and long term funds from the interna-
tional community, but gives back a lot in 
terms of saving human lives. 
Therefore, we believe that the inter-
national community should pay much 
more attention ro every country affected 
by CBUs, as a global and humanitarian 
justice. And mostly, we believe that the 
international community should address 
much more attention to the issue of pos-
sible funher use of CBUs in upcoming 
conflicts, as in Iraq. • 
*All graphics courtesy of the author. 
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Fernando Termentini 
Imersos Mine Action Unit 
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Total number of Percent of area Number of 
CBUs dropped cleared unexploded CBUs 
800 80 484 (60 percent) 
1,200 90 513 ( 43 percent) 
• F1gure 1. Examples of CBU data collected. 
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• 
The U.S. Humanitarian Mine 
Action Program in Iraq 
The United States government has developed a wide-ranging plan 
to build an indigenous mine action capability within Iraq. The plan 
will help rid Iraq of the threat of landmines and UXO so that the 
country can focus on rebuilding it's society. 
by the United States 
Humanitarian Mine Action 
Program 
Imagine growing up in a coLmtry where 
you had to live with the sounds of gunfire 
and the glow of missiles keeping you awake 
at night. Imagine the overwhelming feeling 
of joy when these terrors ended. Imagine 
wanting to run freely among your friends, 
but not being able to, because of the 
dangerous objects that lay around your 
neighborhood long after the war is over. 
Iraq is such a country that now, more then 
ever, needs an organized, well-developed 
program to remove these threatening objects. 
In order to help provide d1is humanitarian 
assistance, the United States government has 
developed a robust and wide-ranging 
plan to build an indigenous mine action 
capability within the country. The plan 
will help rid Iraq of the threat of 
landmines and UXO. With the help of 
the United States, the United Nations and 
other countries around the world, Iraq will 
be able to foresee the end of it's landmine 
problem and focus on rebuilding 
it's society. 
The LandminefUXO Problem 
Iraq has been the victim of violent 
conflict throughout its hisrory, which, in 
recent years, has left the land plagued with 
landmines and UXO, disrupting the social, 
economic and environmental development 
of the country. Before Operation Iraqi 
Freedom (OIF), an estimated 10-1 5 
mi llion landmines were deployed in 
Iraq, dating from conflicts as far back 
as World War II, with the majority of 
the landmines laid during the Iran/Iraq 
War from 1980 to 1988. International 
observe rs consider that landmines 
present a clear risk in Iraq, but a more 
significant threat is posed by UXO. T he 
International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) reported in 2001 that UXO 
from previous conflicts have constituted 
the major humanitarian threat for the 
past several years in northern Iraq, along the 
border with Iran, as well as a throughout 
central and southern Iraq. The problem is 
now exacerbated by the widespread 
presence of abandoned munitions and 
unexploded remnants from the most 
recent conflict. 
With the cessation of hostilities, 
United States Cenrral Command 
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(USCENTCOM) set up procedures to 
identifY minefield locations throughout 
Iraq. Over 2,500 minefields, 2,200 UXO/ 
sub-munitions locations and thousands of 
abandoned munitions sites have been 
identified, and more are found on a daily 
basis. USCENTCOM has also established 
mechanisms to transfer information to 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
about the minefield and U:X:O locations 
as part of the effort to clear the land of 
these silent threats. 
Prior to OIF, the landmine/UXO 
problem was we ll-documented in 
nonhern Iraq only, thanks to a survey con-
ducted by the United Nations. It was in 
the north that the only substantial mine 
action efforts took place, consisting of 
landmine/UXO clearance and mine risk 
education (MRE). The Iraqi government, 
however, rook a dim view of mine action 
in the north, attempting to bring such 
practices to a halt. According to the • EOO stockpi les . 
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